An important source of inefficiency in long-term debt contracts is the debt dilution problem, wherein a country or firm ignores the adverse impact of new borrowing on the market value of outstanding debt and, therefore, borrows too much and defaults too frequently. A commonly proposed remedy to the debt dilution problem is seniority of debt, wherein creditors who lent first are given priority in any bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings. The goal of this paper is to incorporate seniority in a quantitatively realistic, infinite horizon model of sovereign debt and default and examine, both theoretically and quantitatively, the extent to which seniority can mitigate the debt dilution problem.
Introduction
Debt is one of the main vehicles via which firms and sovereign countries finance investment and consumption. While debt payments are typically non-contingent, default on debt is generally always a possibility and we see both firms and countries defaulting frequently on their debt.
Given the deadweight costs of default, a major focus of the debt literature has been on understanding (and proposing) institutional arrangements that can make debt contracts more efficient so that the value of the firm or utility of the country is maximized. When long-term debt is involved, a major source of inefficiency is the debt dilution problem, wherein the country or firm ignores the adverse impact of new borrowing on the market value of outstanding debt and, therefore, borrows too much and defaults too frequently. In the absence of an institutional arrangement that protects long-term creditors from future losses in value, creditors lend funds at an interest rate that is high enough to cover these losses (in expectation). In the sovereign debt context, Hatchondo, Martinez & Sosa-Padilla (2011) have attempted to quantify the impact of the debt dilution problem on the level and volatility of default risk and find it to be very important. Thus the possibility of debt dilution apparently leads to costly debt and first-order welfare losses for the sovereign or firm. 1 A commonly proposed remedy to the debt dilution problem is seniority of debt, wherein creditors who lent first are required to be paid in full before creditors who lent later. In the corporate finance literature, Fama & Miller (1972) gave an early discussion of how creditors of a firm can protect themselves from dilution by making their loans senior. In the sovereign debt literature, Bolton & Jeanne (2009) show that seniority leads to the socially optimal outcome in a model of sovereign debt with possibility of dilution. On the other hand, other studies -such as Hennessey (2004) for corporate debt and Saravia (2010) for sovereign debt -argue that giving seniority to the most recently issued debt might lead to better outcomes if investment decisions are endogenous (Hennessey (2004) ) or if there is the possibility of an inefficient default due to coordination difficulties among existing debt holders (Saravia (2010) ). Although the presence or absence of seniority is not the focus of their work, Bizer & DeMarzo (1992) show that if the borrower can influence the probability of default through his effort decisions, the ability to borrow sequentially can lead to 1 Another problem that arises is that the possibility of default on existing debt might distort effort and investment decisions, once long-term debt has been issued.
inefficiently high levels of debt and default even if seniority among creditors is respected.
While these studies provide valuable insights into the cost of debt dilution and the role of seniority in mitigating or exacerbating it, the insights come from settings that are quite stylized.
In most studies, the dynamic setting either involves a small number of periods (generally, two or three) or, when the dynamic setting is an infinite horizon one, the borrowing problem is not fully analyzed. Thus, these studies cannot shed much light on whether an institutional change in favor of seniority is worth undertaking in a more complex dynamic setting. The goal of this paper is to partially fill this gap by incorporating seniority in a quantitatively realistic, infinite horizon model of sovereign debt and default and computing the welfare gains from enforcing seniority.
The main challenge to incorporating seniority in a quantitatively realistic dynamic setting comes from the potentially high dimensionality of the borrower's state space. In order to compute the price of bonds of different seniority, one would have to keep track of the quantity of bonds issued at different times in the past (bonds issued earlier being more senior to bonds issued later). This can easily to lead to many continuous state variables, making the computation of default probabilities intractable. A key methodological contribution of this paper is to show that it is possible to collapse this potentially very large state space by indexing each bond with its unique rank at its time of issue. With this indexation scheme, a single additional continuous state variable is enough to handle seniority in a dynamic model with long-term debt and default. 2 Although the framework developed here can be easily applied to models of defaultable corporate debt, the application we will focus on this paper is with regard to sovereign debt. The model builds on the one presented in Chatterjee & Eyigungor (2011) which, in turn, builds on the contributions of Eaton & Gersovitz (1981) , Aguiar & Gopinath (2006) , Arellano (2008) and others. The country 2 In this regard, there are two separate challenges that have to be met. First, to talk meaningfully about seniority one must allow for long-term debt. If it is assumed that the maximum maturity of any debt is T periods, in an ongoing dynamic setting one has to keep track of at least T continuous state variables (namely, the size of obligations that are due in the next T periods) to correctly compute default probabilities. Even for small values of T (say, 3 or 4), the problem becomes computationally intractable. One way to address this dimensionality challenge is to model long-term debt as debt that matures probabilistically, as in Hatchondo & Martinez (2009) and Chatterjee & Eyigungor (2011) . Because each outstanding bond has the same probability of maturing in future periods, there is no need to keep track of when any individual bond was issued -all bond, regardless of the date of issue, have the same payoff structure going forward. The second dimensionality challenge comes comes from incorporating seniority in this random maturity set up. When there is seniority, a bond needs to be distinguished by its "time-since-issuance" since a bond that has existed longer (i.e., was issued earlier) will have priority over bonds that have existed for a shorter period with regard to any repayment following default.In a random maturity set up, there may be bonds outstanding that were issued many, many periods ago. Once again, the dimensionality of the state space explodes: The number of continuous state variables can be very large, making the problem computationally intractable.
borrows long-term in a competitive bond market and has the option to default on its debt. Following default, with some delay (potentially) the sovereign renegotiates its debt level down. Thus there is payment on defaulted debt in the sense that the old debt is settled with new debt. During the period of default, and in the periods between default and settlement if there is a delay in settlement, the sovereign does not have access to international financial markets and suffers a loss in output as well.
Initially we assume that the average delay in settlement is exogenously given and the level of debt agreed to in the settlement is an exogenous function of output at the time of settlement and, potentially, the level of debt that is in default. Within this set up, we examine how the sovereign behaves when there is no seniority of debt versus when there is. Calibrating the model to Argentine facts and assuming no outstanding debt, we find that moving from the current situation where there is no seniority clause to one where there is improves Argentine welfare by almost 1.6 percent of aggregate consumption in perpetuity. Thus, the estimated welfare gain from implementing seniority are considerable. A portion of the gain comes, as expected, from the sovereign internalizing more of the costs of additional borrowing but some of the gain also comes from the fact that more debt can be sustained in equilibrium when there is seniority (the intuition for both effects is explained later in the paper). We also show that this gain is generally decreasing in the level of outstanding debt, if enforcing seniority requires making existing creditors the most senior claimants. Indeed, for sufficiently high levels of prior debt, enforcing seniority can lead to a welfare loss.
In the last part of the paper, we seek to understand the conditions under which seniority can fully solve the debt dilution problem. Bolton and Jeanne (2009) showed (in a more stylized setting) that seniority fully solves the debt dilution problem if renegotiation is costless and lenders have all the bargaining power. Our aim is to determine the conditions under which this result goes through in our more complex setting. We do this in two parts. First we provide conditions on the level of debt agreed to at the time of settlement (following default) that, along with certain monotonicity conditions on decision rules, imply that the equilibrium price function is dilution-free, i.e., the price of a unit bond of any given ranking is independent of additional borrowing. Thus, these conditions make clear what is needed to solve the debt dilution problem completely in a fully dynamic setting.
Second, we describe a simple environment that delivers the required monotonicity in decision rules and delivers the debt level at settlement that solves the debt dilution problem. Specifically, we show that all the conditions needed for seniority to solve the debt dilution problem are satisfied if (i) renegotiation is costless, (ii) lenders as a group have the ability to make a one-time take-it-orleave-it offer to the sovereign in terms of a debt write-down, (iii) the sovereign suffers permanent financial autarky if it does not accept this offer and (iv) the sovereign is not permitted to buy back its debt in the open market. The first two conditions are the natural analogs of the conditions in Bolton and Jeanne, while the last two conditions are important for establishing the required monotonicity conditions for decision rules.
Preferences and Endowments
Time is discrete and denoted t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. The sovereign receives a strictly positive endowment x t each period. The stochastic evolution of x t is governed by the sum of persistent and transitory components:
Here m t ∈ M = [−m,m] is a transitory income shock drawn independently each period from a mean zero probability distribution with continuous cdf µ(m), and y t is a persistent income shock that follows a finite-state Markov chain with state space Y ⊂ R ++ and transition law Pr{y t+1 = y |y t = y} = F (y, y ) > 0, y and y ∈ Y .
The sovereign maximizes expected utility over consumption sequences, where the utility from any given sequence c t is given by:
The momentary utility function u(·) : [0, ∞) → R is continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and |u(c)| < U .
Market Arrangements and the Option to Default
The sovereign can borrow in the international credit market with the option to default. We analyze long-term debt contracts that mature probabilistically (Chatterjee & Eyigungor (2011) ). Specifically, each unit of outstanding debt matures next period with probability λ. If the unit does not mature, which happens with probability 1 − λ, it gives out a coupon payment z. We assume that unit bonds are infinitesimally small -meaning that if b unit bonds of type (z, λ) are outstanding at the start of next period, the issuer's coupon obligations next period will be z · (1 − λ)b with certainty and the issuer's payment-of-principal obligations will be λb with certainty.
The option to default means that the sovereign has the right to unilaterally stop servicing its debt obligations -i.e., stop making coupon and principal payments. Default is costly in several ways. First, the sovereign loses access to the international credit market -cannot borrow or save in the period of default. And, following the period of default, the sovereign continues in financial autarky for a random number of periods until some settlement with creditors is reached.
Specifically, settlement happens with probability 0 < ξ < 1 and when it happens the sovereign agrees to a new debt level given by the function G(y, k), where k is the amount of debt defaulted on and y is the persistent component of output in the period of settlement. Second, during its sojourn in financial autarchy (the period of default and the random number of periods between default and settlement), the sovereign loses φ(y) > 0 of its persistent component of output, y.
Third, the sovereign's transitory component of income drops to −m in the period of default. 3
We make some assumptions about φ and G. Regarding φ we assume that y − φ(y) is increasing in y and that y min − φ(y min ) −m > 0, which ensures that y − φ(y)
Regarding G we assume that for any y ∈ Y , G(y, k) is increasing in k, i.e., the larger is the amount of defaulted debt (the more negative is k) the larger is the amount of debt issued in the settlement (all else the same).
We assume that there is a single type of bond (z, λ) available in this economy. We assume that the sovereign can choose the size of its debt from a finite set B = {b I , b I−1 , . . . b 2 , b 1 , 0}, where
As is customary in this literature, we will view debt as negative assets.
Since there is repayment on defaulted debt, we need to specify how this repayment is divided among existing creditors. We will analyze two different market arrangements, one which treats all existing creditors equally and one in which creditor are ranked by seniority and junior claimants receive payments only if senior claimants have been fully compensated. For each market arrangement, we will assume that lenders are risk-neutral and that the market for sovereign debt is competitive. 
s.t.
The sovereign's lifetime utility under financial autarchy reflects the fact that it loses φ(y) of its output and can expect to be let back into the international credit market next period with probability ξ. The main new element (relative to models where there is never repayment on defaulted debt) is that re-entry into the international credit market occurs not at zero debt but at a level of debt that is determined by the fundamentals at the time of re-entry (or settlement) and the level of debt in default.
Next,
The above assumes that the budget set under repayment is nonempty, meaning there is at least one choice of b that leads to nonnegative consumption. But it is possible that (y, b, m) is such that all choices of b lead to negative consumption. In this case, repayment is simply not an option and the value of V (y, m, b) is set to −∞.
Finally,
Since W determines both X and V (via equations (3) and (4), respectively) equation (5) 
Equilibrium
The world one-period risk-free rate r f is taken as exogenous. Since there is repayment on defaulted debt, there will be a market price of this debt. Let q D (y, k) denote the market price of a unit defaulted bond when the total number of defaulted bonds outstanding is k and current fundamentals of the economy is y. Then, under competition, the price of a unit bond satisfies the following pricing equation:
Under competition, the market price of defaulted debt must be such as to ensure zero expected profits for any investor who buys this debt. Let P (y, m, G(y, k)) be the per-unit value of the new debt issued in settlement when the state at the time of settlement is (y, m) and the amount of debt issued in settlement is G(y, k). Then,
The value of the debt offered in settlement takes account of the possibility that the sovereign may default again immediately upon settlement, in which case the per-unit value of the new debt will be the per-unit value of defaulted debt when the state is y and amount of defaulted debt is G(y, k). If the sovereign does not default immediately, then with probability λ the bond matures and returns 1 and with the complementary probability the bondholder receives the coupon payment and the market value of an unmatured bond. This value depends on post-settlement state (y, m, G(y, k)).
Given this, the market price of a unit of defaulted debt will satisfy the following functional equation:
Observe that if the quantity G(y , k)/k is less than 1 (which, typically, it will be in an equilibrium), a unit defaulted bond will, upon settlement, become less than a unit of the restructured debt. We can interpret (k − G(y , k))/k as the "haircut" taken by creditors in the settlement process.
It is worth pointing out that the possibility of debt dilution can lead to behavior that blurs the distinction between repayment and default: Rather than defaulting on its debt rightaway, the sovereign may choose to borrow as much as it can and then default with certainty next period. To understand why, suppose that G(y, k) is independent of k. Suppose the sovereign services its current debt b and then issues enough debt, denoted B , such that default is cer-tain next period. 5 What does it gain from this strategy? The sovereign has to pay for the maturing part of the outstanding debt and make coupon payments on debt that does not mature, which is equal to [λ + (1 − λ)z] b. To offset this, there is the revenue that comes from is-
Since default is certain for B , the outstanding value of its obligations next period is going to be q D (y , G(y )) × G(y ). Therefore,
. Since this expression is independent of B , the sovereign can maximize revenue from the new issuances by minimizing q(y, B )(1 − λ)(−b). Now observe
imized by making b go to -∞ which makes the price of existing debt go to zero. So whenever
is positive, the country might prefer to borrow as much as it can and then default for certain next period rather than default on its debt rightaway. By borrowing as much as it can today, the sovereign dilutes the value of existing debt as much as possible. Put differently, it promises as much of its default payment as possible to investors who buy its new debt. In this way, the sovereign increases its current consumption at the expense of its existing creditors and postpones the costs of default by one period. 6
Issuing as much debt as possible before defaulting is not optimal if the debt is short-term (λ = 1) or if there is no repayment following default (G(y, k) = 0). In first case, there is no outstanding debt to dilute and, in the second case, borrowing beyond the point where default is certain means that q(y, b )b is zero. In either case, the sovereign does not get any extra consumption by this strategy. 7 More generally, this strategy of borrowing as much as possible prior to default is also not optimal if the ∆ defined above is negative. This will happen if (−b) is too high or if
is too low, i.e., if the gain from dilution is not large enough to more than offset the current debt service payments.
5 Any b for which ymax +m + [z + (1 − λ)]b < 0 will do since the sovereign will never have enough resources to service this amount of debt.
6 When G(y, k) is independent of k, the payoff from defaulting in the current period is X(y, −m) while the payoff from issuing an infinite amount of debt is u(y + ∆) + βE y |y X(y , −m). If ∆ > 0, defaulting on an infinite amount of debt will generally be better than defaulting on a finite amount of debt.
7 In Yue (2010) debt recovery after default is of the from G(y ) but there is no gain to issuing huge amounts of debt prior to default because debt is short-term. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011) and Hatchondo and Martinez (2009) have long-term debt but there is no repayment following default so there is no incentive to dilute existing debt prior to default.
The straightforward way to keep track of seniority is to introduce the "time-since-issuance" as an additional state variable. But, given the random maturity nature of our bonds, this would require keeping track of many (potentially, infinitely many) continuous states. To circumvent this problem, we propose a novel and computationally tractable way of keeping track of seniority that does not involve keeping track of the "time-since-issuance."
The idea is to assume that every unit bond outstanding has a ranking denoted by s. If there are b units of the debt outstanding, the ranking of any given unit bond is some number s ∈ [b, 0].
The closer s is to 0, the higher is the ranking of the unit bond and higher is its seniority. We continue to assume that b is a member of the finite set B. However, s is a continuous variable since it is a member of [b, 0] . In effect, we are assuming that the sovereign can issue bonds in chunks {b 1 , b 2 ,. . . , b I } but within each chunk there is a ranking of unit bonds that compose that chunk.
How does the ranking of a unit bond evolve over time? Suppose that the sovereign has b unit bonds outstanding at the end of any period. Consider a unit bond with rank s ∈ [b, 0]. Since any unit bond has a probability λ of maturing next period, among the bonds that are higher ranked than s a fraction λ will mature. Thus, at the start of next period, there will only be (1 − λ)s bonds with rank higher than s. This means that we can preserve the current ranking among all bonds with rank greater than or equal to s if we reset the rank of each unit bond that survives into the next period to (1 − λ)s. This re-setting rule implies that the unit bond with rank 0 (the most senior unit bond) continues to have rank 0 as long as it survives and any other unit bond's rank approaches 0 at a geometric rate the longer it survives.
If the sovereign issues new bonds in any period (i.e., b < (1 − λ)b), each member of the mass of newly issued bonds is assigned a unique rank s in the interval [b , (1 − λ)b]. If the sovereign buys back debt (i.e., b > (1 − λ)b), then we assume that it is the mass of least senior bonds, namely, the unit bonds with s ∈ [(1 − λ)b, b ] that are bought back (this assumption is discussed in more detail below).
Since the payoff to the bondholder in case of default depends on the rank (seniority) of the bond held, the price of a unit bond will now depend on its ranking. Denote the price of unit bond with s ≥ b by q(y, b, s). As before, denote the sovereign's lifetime utility by W (y, m, b), its utility under repayment by V (y, m, b) and its utility under exclusion by X(y, m, b). Then,
where R(y, b, b ) denotes the revenue received from changing the asset level from b to b (it will be positive if new bonds are issued and negative if bonds are bought back) and is given by:
If the sovereign is buying back bonds, it will attempt to minimize its purchasing cost: We will show later in the paper that more senior unit bond fetches a higher price than less senior unit bond, so the sovereign can minimize purchasing costs by purchasing the most junior debt. 8 We also assume that the price of unit bonds bought back is equal to the price of the most junior debt following the buyback, regardless of seniority. The reason for making this assumption is that a bondholder with a unit bond with s > b who does not sell the bond during the buyback, will be in possession of a bond with ranking b following the buyback. This unit bond can sell for q(y, b , b ). Thus, a bondholder with a unit bond s < b would be unwilling to sell at any price less than q(y, b , b ). Furthermore, bondholders who hold unit bonds with ranking s > b have bonds whose price, namely, q(y, b , s),
is at least as large as q(y, b , b ). Thus, a sovereign who wishes to buy back debt can implement its plans at least cost if it announces that it will buy back the most junior debt at the price q(y, b , b ).
Matters are simpler if the sovereign plans on issuing new debt. In this case, the revenue received from the sale is the integral of the revenue received from each unit bond with ranking
We continue to assume that in the case of default, the sovereign is excluded from the interna-tional capital markets in the period of default and, following the period of default, the sovereign is let back into the international capital market with probability ξ. At the time of re-entry, the sovereign agrees to service G(y, k) units of debt going forward, where y is the fundamentals of the economy at the time of re-entry/settlement and k is the level of defaulted debt. The ranking of a unit bond in the restructured debt is simply its ranking s in the defaulted debt, provided s ≥ G(y, k). If s < G(y, k), the unit bond is not part of the settlement and it ceases to exist.
The expressions for X(y, m, k) and W (y, m, b) remain the same as in the model without seniority.
As before, the world one-period risk-free rate is r f . With seniority, the market price of a unit of defaulted debt will depend on the rank of the unit bond, since more senior bonds are paid off before less senior bonds. Denote by q D (y, k, s) the market price of a unit of defaulted debt of rank s ≥ k.
Then the price of a unit bond of rank s ≥ b satisfies the following functional equation:
Observe that in the event there is repayment the rank of the unit bond is (1 − λ)s if the bond is not bought back, i.e., a(y , m , b ) < (1 − λ)s, and the rank is a(y , m , b ) if the bond is bought back,
When seniority is enforced, payment on defaulted debt in the event of settlement depends on the ranking of the bond. Let P (y, m, G(y, k), s) denote the value of the payment on a defaulted bond of rank s when the current state of the economy is (y, m) and the amount of debt issued in settlement is G(y, k). If s < G(y, k) (i.e., the rank of the unit debt is too low to be part of the
The value of the payment depends on what happens in the period of settlement: If the sovereign does not default, then with probability λ the unit bond matures and the bondholder receives 1 and with probability (1 − λ) the bond does not mature and the bondholder receives the coupon payment z and the market value of an unmatured bond of rank s. 9 This market value depends on the current state of the economy y and the amount of debt issued in the period of settlement, namely, a(y, m, G(y, k)). If the sovereign defaults immediately upon settlement (which, again, is possible), the bondholder receives defaulted debt of rank s, where the number of bonds in default is now G(y, k).
Putting all this together, the price of a defaulted bond of rank s is given by
Since seniority is the key aspect of this market arrangement, we give a characterization result regarding the behavior of the equilibrium price schedule with respect to s and confirm our earlier claim that, all else remaining the same, the price of a unit bond is increasing in seniority (or rank)
s. The proof of this claim uses properties of contraction maps.
Proposition 1
The equilibrium pricing function q * (y, b , s) is increasing in s.
Proof. See Appendix 6 Seniority and Welfare: The Argentine Case
In this section we explore the quantitative implications, both positive and normative, of introducing seniority. We focus on Argentina, the country most intensively studied in the quantitative sovereign 9 For simplicity, the coupon payment on the restructured debt is assumed to be the same as the original debt. Table 1 . Regarding repayment, we assume that G(y, k) = 0.3 ×ȳ. This choice of G is motivated by the fact that during the most recent default episode, bondholders received 30 cents on each dollar of defaulted debt and the mean level of debt in Argentina was equal to mean quarterly real GDP (or 25 percent of mean annual GDP). That leaves three other parameters to be calibrated, namely, Table 2 reports the parameter values that achieve these targets Table 3 reports the effects of moving from an environment without seniority to one in which there is seniority. 10 There is significant increase in the lifetime utility of the sovereign from this move. In the absence of seniority, the value of constant consumption that gives the same average life-time utility starting from 0 debt and no transitory income shock (the average is computed over the invariant distribution of y) is 1.0162. If the sovereign were to issue bonds ranked by seniority, the constant consumption equivalent of new average lifetime utility rises to 1.0328. Thus, in constant consumption equivalents, the sovereign would be willing to pay 1.6 percent of consumption in perpetuity for this arrangement. Where does this gain in welfare come from? One sees that seniority raises the average debt level and, simultaneously, lowers the frequency of default (default probability). Both factors contribute to the increase in welfare. To better understand these effects, we will first analyze why seniority raises the average debt level and then explain why it lowers the default frequency.
10 We have assumed that the country reaches settlement with the same face value of debt regardless of whether seniority is imposed or not. In reality, the nature of negotiations might change during a default episode depending on whether all creditors are treated equally or if some have higher-ranked claims than others. The nature of the renegotiation problem between creditors and sovereign is an active area of research with no settled insights. Given this, we chose to focus on differences in welfare keeping G(y, k) = 0.3 ×ȳ the same between the two frameworks.
When there is resettlement of defaulted debt, the cost of default includes the real value of the resettled debt with which the sovereign eventually exits autarky. With seniority, the value of the debt received in settlement is almost the same as its risk-free value. This is because any unit bond with ranking equal to or higher than 0.3 ×ȳ is essentially protected from default (the only loss suffered is the loss due to delays in making coupon and principal payments during the autarky period following default). Thus the sovereign expects to pay all the coupons and principal payments on the re-settled debt. In the absence of seniority, however, the market value of the resettled debt is far from its risk-free value. As noted earlier, in the absence of seniority the sovereign promises all repayment on defaulted debt to new debtors by diluting outstanding debt as much as possible prior to default. Given that the sovereign does not expect to pay back the risk-free value of the resettled debt, the real value of the obligations incurred by the resetttlement is much lower in the absence of seniority. Thus, even though the output costs of default are the same regardless of whether there is seniority or not, the full cost of default is greater when seniority is enforced. As a result, the level of debt that can be sustained in equilibrium without default is higher with seniority than without. The increase in the level of sustainable debt is is welfare improving because the sovereign is impatient and prefers to borrow.
To understand why the frequency of default is lower when seniority is enforced, we need to understand the incentives that the sovereign faces to extend its borrowing into regions where the probability of default is higher. Suppose that the sovereign issues additional debt in the current period, i.e., b < (1 − λ)b. In the absence of seniority, the revenue from marginal unit of debt sold is (treating b as a continuous variable):
The term q(y, b ) is the revenue from the sale of the marginal unit. But since q(y, b ) is increasing in b , this sale decreases the value of all bonds (the ones being currently issued as well as the ones that already exist) by
. This means that the sovereign loses the amount
on all the inframarginal sales. The important point to note here is that although the sale of the marginal unit reduces the value of all outstanding debt, the sovereign cares only about the loss on the inframarginal sales, i.e., the loss imposed on the new debt being issued. In effect, the marginal sale expropriates resources from existing creditors by the amount
When seniority is enforced, and assuming again that b < (1 − λ)b, the revenue gain from the marginal unit of debt sold is
The sovereign receives q(y, b , b ) from the sale of the marginal unit but loses some revenue on its inframarginal sales because of depreciation of the value of the inframarginal units. As bonds with different rankings will be affected by different amounts from the increase in debt, the loss is the integral term in the expression above.
With seniority, the expropriation term analogous to (15) is:
This is the decline in the value of outstanding debt caused by the sale of the marginal unit of debt.
The important point is that the value of the more senior debt is affected much less by new issuances of debt. Indeed, if the sovereign did not spend any time in financial autarky following default, any bond with ranking above 0.3 ×ȳ would be fully protected because these bondholders would be paid off in new debt that exactly resembles the defaulted debt. In this case, the value of all bonds that have a ranking higher than 0.3×ȳ would be (almost) independent of the total debt of the sovereign.
The same logic applies to the value of debt with ranking less than 0.3 ×ȳ but close to it. The value of these bonds may also be almost independent of the level of total debt issued because surviving bonds go up in seniority at the geometric rate (1 − λ). Bonds that curently have ranking below 0.3 ×ȳ but close to it will also be protected by the time default comes around.
In this way, seniority protects the value of outstanding bonds from being diluted by the issuance of new debt. The attenuation of the debt dilution problem implies that the loss in value implied by a higher probability of default is borne disproportionately by the new debt that is issued. This in turn means that the revenue collected from new issuances drops more sharply when there is seniority versus when there is not. This discourages the sovereign from extending borrowing into regions where there is a significant probability of default and both spreads and the frequency of default is lower with seniority. Since default is costly, the reduction in the frequency of default is a second source of the welfare gain stemming from seniority.
Could the existence of prior debt negate the welfare gains from introducing seniority? The reason for considering this question is that sovereign debt contracts typically include a pari passu clause which asserts that existing creditors cannot, under any circumstance, be treated any worse than new creditors. This clause implies that seniority can be introduced only if existing creditors are made senior to all new creditors. But if the country already has a lot of debt outstanding, making all that debt senior will result in a large wealth transfer from the sovereign to existing creditors.
The loss in welfare from this transfer will cut into the welfare gain the sovereign experiences from enforcing seniority among new creditors. We investigated the effect of prior debt on the welfare gain from introducing seniority. We assumed that when seniority is introduced, outstanding debt get ranked in some way and new issuances get ranks below the lowest-ranked prior debt. Figure 1 shows the welfare gains to Argentina from switching to a seniority regime for different levels of existing debt for 3 different levels of current output. Note, first, that even when prior debt is 0, the welfare gain from switching to seniority varies with the output level, the gain being higher for lower levels of output. This is intuitive: when output is low, the sovereign has a greater need to borrow and imposing seniority helps to lower borrowing costs and, therefore, raises welfare. As the level of prior debt increases, the welfare gain from imposing seniority drops for the middle and high output levels but rises for the low output level. The reason for the divergent behavior is that when output is low, probability of default increases rapidly even for low levels of debt; for middle to high levels of output, the probability of default is virtually zero until debt reaches very high levels. This means that if seniority is introduced when output is low and there is moderate level of debt outstanding, the welfare-reducing effects of the wealth transfer is offset by the welfare-enhancing effects of lower spreads on exisiting debt and this is increasingly so for levels of debt up to 60 percent of average output. Beyond that point, the welfare gain drops for the low level of output as well. It is noteworthy that there continues to be a welfare gain from introducing seniority for fairly high levels of prior debt. Thus, quantitatively speaking, the presence of prior debt does not appear to be a major hurdle to incorporating a seniority clause in sovereign debt contracts.
When is Seniority a Solution to the Debt Dilution Problem?
In this section, our objective is to determine conditions under which seniority fully solves the debt dilution problem. By "solving the debt dilution problem" we mean that the equilibrium price function q * has the property that given any y and s, q * (y,b , s) = q * (y, b , s) for allb < b ≤ s. In words, the price of a unit bond with given seniority s is unaffected by additional borrowing by the sovereign.
We establish two results. First, we show that if there is no delay in reaching a settlement and optimal decision rules satisfy certain monotonicity conditions, seniority solves the debt dilution problem provided G(y, k) is specified in a particular way. Second, we describe a bargaining environment that delivers all the needed monotonicity conditions and, if renegotiation is costless, plausibly delivers the G(y, k) function that solves the debt dilution problem. This second result extends Bolton and Jeanne's (2009) finding that seniority can solve the debt dilution problem if renegotiation is costless and the creditors have all the bargaining power, to a fully dynamic setting.
In presenting the theoretical arguments, we will suppress the transitory shock m and assume that the sovereign is not permitted to buy back its debt in the open market. Also, for the second of the two points mentioned above, it is important that the payoff from default be independent of bond prices q. So we take the payoff from default to be some given function X(y). 11
Then, the utility from repayment, V (y, b), solves the following Bellman equation:
(18) immediately gets back a new bond that has exactly the same payoff structure as the old bond. Hence, the increase in the likelihood of default has no effect on the value of thes unit bond. 12 To complete the argument we must also consider what happens if some other value of y is realized next period.
Here, we can show that as long as the monotonicity conditions are satisfied, the payoff to thes bond remains unaffected by the additional borrowing (the formal argument is recursive and uses the logic of contraction maps).
We now describe an environment which can throw some light on the determination of G(y, k) and the conditions under which the requirements noted in Proposition 2 will actually hold. Suppose that an indebted sovereign has two options with regard to not servicing its debt. First, it can permanently default in which case the sovereign does not make any payment ever on the defaulted debt and goes into financial autarky forever. Second, it can agree to a renegotiation of its debt wherein it agrees to service a lower level of debt, with creditors being serviced in order of seniority.
Renegotiation is potentially costly, with the cost being a one-period proportional output loss of χ, χ ≥ 0, but the sovereign maintains access to financial markets even in the period of renegotiation.
Assume also that creditors get to make a one-time take-it-or-leave it offer with respect to the renegotiated level of debt. Finally, continue to assume that the sovereign is not permitted to buy back its debt in the open market.
In this environment, if the (y, b) combination is such that permanent default is strictly better than repayment, the sovereign will be tempted to default. However, since creditors do not get anything in the case of a permanent default they have the incentive to accept a debt writedown.
Since creditors have all the bargaining power it is reasonable to assume that they will propose a debt writedown that is just enough to make the sovereign want to service the lower level of debt rather than default and that the sovereign will accept this proposal. 13 Therefore, whenever the sovereign is tempted to default there will be an immediate writedown of the debt and the sovereign will continue on with the lower level of debt and full access to financial markets.
In these circumstances, the dynamic program of the sovereign is as follows:
where,
Then we have the following result:
Proposition 3 If χ = 0 then, under a mild continuity assumption, a dilution-free equilibrium price function q * (y, b , s) exists (i.e., for each y and s, q * (y,b , s) = q * (y, b , s) for allb < b ≤ s).
Proof. See Appendix
Proposition 3 relies on some strong assumptions, in particular, that lenders have all the bargaining power and they have the ability to make a one-time take-it-or-leave it offer and also that resettlement/restructuring does not have any resource costs (χ = 0). If the assumption that lenders have all the bargaining power is dropped but the assumption that bargaining is one-shot is retained,
13 Of course, a debt writedown affects creditors with different rankings differently. As we have already noted, creditors with low enough rankings will not be part of the settlement and will get nothing. Since these creditors get nothing in the case of a permanent default either, they ought to be indifferent between agreeing to or not agreeing to the debt writedown if that is their only choice. Note however that low-ranked creditors do have an incentive to hold out if they believe they can get transfers from senior creditors as compensation for agreeing to the writedown. This "hold out problem" can be avoided if the original debt contract has some form of "collective action clause" that permits senior creditors to force a settlement on all creditors when default is imminent. We will proceed under the assumption that this, in fact, is so.
the bargaining problem will resemble the one analyzed in Yue (2010) . In this case the debt has to be written down more for the settlement to be acceptable to the sovereign, i.e., G(y, k) will exceed b D (y), and seniority will fail to solve the debt dilution problem completely. If the assumption of one-shot bargaining is also dropped in favor of an alternating offer set-up, the bargaining problem will begin to resemble the one analyzed in Benjamin & Wright (2009) who show that both the sovereign and the creditors have an incentive to delay settlement to a more opportune future time.
The possibility of delay in reaching settlement (more so if the delay is costly in terms of resources) will give an additional reason for G(y, k) to exceed b D (y) and, therefore, an additional reason for seniority to be less effective in solving the debt dilution problem. How much less effective remains an interesting research question. The welfare gain results for Argentina presented earlier -where both the writedown as well as the delay were considerable -suggests that seniority may be effective in combating the ill-effects of dilution even if the process of reaching settlement takes time and the sovereign retains considerable bargaining power.
Lemma 1 Let W ⊂ R L and let f : W → R K be a vector-valued function defined on W and let Φ K (W ) be the space of all such functions. Let F (W ) ⊂ Φ K (W ) be set of bounded functions
Proof. It is easy to show that · satisfies all properties of a metric. Hence, (F (W ), · ) is a metric space. To establish completeness of (F (W ), · ), we need to show that every Cauchy sequence in this space converges to an element of the space. Let f n be any sequence in F (W ) such that for any > 0, there exists N such that for all m, n > N , f n − f m < . Fixing w and k, this implies that for all m, n > N , |f k n (w) − f k m (w)| < . By the completeness property of real numbers it follows that f k n (w) converges to some real number f k (w). We will take the function f (w) = (f 1 (w), f 2 (w), · · · , f K (w)) as the candidate function to which the sequence f n converges. Evidently, f (w) ∈ F (W ). To show that f n − f → 0 as n → ∞ , fix > 0. By the Cauchy property, there exists N such that for all m, n ≥ N f m − f n ≤ /2. Then, for any w and k, it follows that for all m, n ≥ N ,
, for m sufficiently far along in the sequence we have |f k m (w) − f (w)| ≤ /2. Hence, it follows that for all m, n ≥ N , |f k n (w) − f k (w)| . Since both w and k were arbitrary, we have that for all n ≥ N , sup x max k |f k (w) − f (w)| = f n − f ≤ . Since was arbitrary, we have
i.e., T is a contraction mapping with modulus β.
Proof. For any f and g ∈ F (W ), f ≤ g+ f − g since we are adding to each component of g the largest absolute difference possible between the f and g values for any given component. Then, by properties (i) and (ii), we have (T f )(w)(T g)(w) + β f − g . Reversing the roles of f and g and using the same logic gives (T g)(w) ≤ (T f )(w) + f − g . Fix w and k. Then, combining the two
Since both w and k were arbitrary, we must
T is a contraction with modulus β.
We are now ready to give the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let q * (y, b, s) and q * D (y, k, s) be equilibrium pricing functions. Let d * (y, m, b) and a * (y, m, b) be the equilibrium default and asset decision rules, respectively. Then, this 4-tuple together satisfy equations (11) 
Then, T satisfies both monotonicity and discounting. To see this, observe that if g(w) ≥ f (w), then from inspection it is clear that (T g)(w) ≥ (T f )(w) and hence T satisfies monotonicity. Next, consider applying T to f (w) + a. Then,
and
Hence (T [f (w) + a])(w) ≤ (T f (w)) + βa, where β = 1/(1 + r). Hence T satisfies discounting.
Finally note that if f (w) = L then (T f )(w) ≤ L and so, by monotonicity, f ∈ F (W ) implies
It is also clear from inspection that T preserves monotonicity with respect to s: there is an unique f * ∈ F (W ) such that (T f * )(w) = f * (w). Since (q * (y, b , s), q * D (y, k, s)) satisfies equations (11)- (13), (q * (y, b , s), q * D (y, k, s)) must be f * (w). Since f * ∈ F (W ), it must be true that q * (y, b , s) and q * D (y, k, s) are increasing in s.
Proof of Proposition 2. We have to show that for each y and s, q(y, s, s) = q(y, b , s) for all b < s.
The basic equation is
We will and T is a contraction map with modulus 1/(1 + r).
We will show that if q satisfies (22), then (T q)(w) satisfies (22) 
By (22), we have that
Next, suppose that y is such that d * (y , s) = d * (y , b ) = 1. Then, the payoff when debt is s or
Since d * (y, b) is decreasing in b these are the only 3 cases we need to examine.
Putting the results together we conclude that (T q)(y , b , s) = (T q)(y , s, s) for all b < s. To complete the proof, observe that the set F (W ) = {f ∈ F (W ) : f satisfies (22)} is a closed subset of F (W ). It follows (from Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 1 to Theorem 3.1 of Stokey & Lucas (1989) again) that f * ∈ F (W ). Hence, it must be true that q * (y, b , s) satisfies (22).
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 3.
Let 
It is easy to establish that T q satisfies monontonicity and discounting and is, therefore, a contraction map. The existence of V (y, b; q) follows from the Contraction Mapping Theorem. To show monotonicity, let q 1 ≤ q 0 , both in Q. Then, observe that (T q 1 V (·; q 0 ))(y, b) ≤ V (y, b, ; q 0 ). From the monotonicity of T q 1 it follows
To establish the continuity of V with respect to q, it is sufficient to establish that T q is continuous in q ( Hutson & Pym (1980) , Proposition 4.3.6, pp. 117) and for this it is sufficient to establish that the r.h.s of the budget inequality is continuous in q. Let q k be a sequence of functions in Q converging toq. Since each member of the sequence is a non-negative integrable function bounded above by L, by the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem,
This establishes that the operator T q is continuous in q and, hence, V (y, b; q) is continuous in q.
Corollary 1 d(y, b; q) and b D (y; χ, q) are monotonically increasing in q.
Proof. Follows from the monotonicity of V (y, b; q) and the fact that X(y) is independent of q.
Lemma 4 
. Therefore, it follows that if the beginning-of-period debt is b 1 , choosing b 0 implies consumptionc strictly less than c 0 . To complete the proof, observe that the Lemma 5 Q is a closed under pointwise convergence.
Proof. Let q k (y, b , s) be a sequence in Q converging pointwise toq(y, b , s). Since every element of the sequence is bounded above by L and satisfies property (i) and (ii), it is evident that the pointwise limit will also be bounded above by L and satisfy property (i) and (ii). To establish the result, all we need to confirm is that the pointwise limit of a sequence of integrable functions is also Proof. We will first prove that if q ∈ Q, then (Hq) ∈ Q. First, observe that for any q ∈ Q, . Hence, the equilibrium price function q * must satisfy q * = (Hq * ), where H is the operator defined in Lemma 6.
We will construct a convergent sequence of price functions whose limit will be the equilibrium price function, provided that H is continuous at the limit point. We now claim that q * is an equilibrium pricing function provided H is continuous at q * . Observe that q * = lim k (H k q 0 ) = H(lim k (H k−1 q 0 )) = (Hq * ), where the first equality is by definition, the second is just relabeling and the third follows from the assumed continuity of H at q * .
Remark: A sufficient condition for H to be continuous at q * is that the decision rules d(y, b; q * ) and a(y, b; q * ) be strictly optimal, meaning that for each (y, b) any feasible action other than the optimal one yields strictly lower utility. To see this, let {q k (y, b)} be the monotonically decreasing sequence converging to q * . Since V (y, b; q) and R(y, b , b; q) are both continuous in q (Lemma 3) and the set of states (y, b) is finite, we can be assured that there exists K such that d(y, b; q * ) and a(y, b; q * ) are the optimal decision rules for all q k (y, b), k > K. This means that the optimal decision rules do not change in the "tail" of the sequence and, therefore, lim k>K (Hq k )(y, b , s) → (Hq * )(y, b , s).
